At a 2004 ceremony in Hanoi, a military honor guard drapes a flag over the remains of a U.S. soldier who had been missing in action. (AP)

Iraq through the prism of Vietnam
COMMENTARY | March 08, 2006

Those who say Iraq is nothing like Vietnam have another guess coming, says retired Gen. William Odom. He lists striking similarities and asserts that only after it pulls out of Iraq can the U.S. hope for international support to deal with anti-Western forces.

By William E. Odom
diane@hudson.org

The Vietnam War experience can’t tell us anything about the war in Iraq – or so it is said.  If you believe that, try looking through this lens, and you may change your mind.  

The Vietnam War had three phases. The War in Iraq has already completed an analogous first phase, is approaching the end of the second phase, and shows signs of entering the third.

Phase One in Vietnam lasted from 1961 until the Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August 1964, authorizing deployment of large U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam. It began with hesitation and a gross misreading of American strategic interests. It concluded with the U.S. use of phony intelligence that made it seem that North Vietnamese patrol boats had attacked U.S. ships in the Tonkin Gulf without provocation.

President Kennedy was ambivalent about deeper involvement, but some of his aides believed that a North Vietnamese takeover of the south would bring Sino-Soviet dominion over all of Southeast Asia. They paid little attention to the emerging Sino-Soviet split, which the Intelligence Community was reporting in the early 1960s.  

Accordingly, the “containment of China” became their goal, their rationale for U.S. strategic purpose – that is, not allowing the Soviet Bloc to expand in this region. Was it really in the American interest to “contain China” in Vietnam? By 1965, Soviet leaders were also pursuing the containment of China, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Did it, then, make sense for the United States to commit large military forces to the pursuit of Soviet objectives in Southeast Asia? Obviously not; the White House’s strategic rationale had no grounding in reality.

Not only Soviet leaders but Ho Chi Minh also wanted to contain China. A long-time loyalist to Moscow and early member of Lenin’s Communist International, he was never under China’s thumb. Yet he cooperated with Beijing to balance his dependency on Moscow, allowing neither to frustrate his aim of unifying all of Vietnam under his rule.

The Johnson Administration used an apparent North Vietnamese attack on U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin on the coast of North Vietnam in the summer of 1964 to persuade Congress to support the introduction of major U.S. ground forces in South Vietnam. We now know that U.S. special operations – incursions into North Vietnam by Navy Seals – played a role in prompting North Vietnamese gun boat actions that became the casus belli for President Johnson. Thus, a misleading interpretation of the known facts, i.e., the intelligence assessment of these events, became the critical factor in making it America’s war, not just Saigon’s war.

Phase One in Iraq, the run-up to the invasion, looks remarkably similar. Broodings about the “necessity” to overthrow Saddam’s regime were heard earlier, but signs of action appeared in January 2002, when President Bush proclaimed his “axis of evil” thesis about Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, countries he accused of acquiring “weapons of mass destruction” and supporting terrorists against the United States. This became the cornerstone of his rationale for invading Iraq, and it was no less ill-conceived than the strategic purpose for President Johnson’s war in Vietnam. It better served the interests of Iran and Osama bin Laden.

Iran had serious scores to settle with Iraq. In 1980, Saddam Hussein launched a bloody war that dragged on until 1988 without a decisive end. That President Bush would destroy Saddam's regime, saving Iran the trouble, was probably beyond its clerics’ wildest dreams.

He did the same for al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden must have been ecstatic. The U.S. invasion opened the way for al Qaeda cadres to enter Iraq by the scores. Killing Americans in Iraq is much easier than killing them in the United States after 9/11.  Moreover, toppling secular Arab leaders – including Saddam – was, and remains, Osama bin Laden’s highest priority aim. America is farther down his list, seen as an intermediate objective in the long struggle to bring his version of radical Islamic rule to all Arab countries.

As it turned out, the alleged intelligence that Iraq had “weapons of mass destruction” and that Saddam aided al Qaeda was grossly wrong. That, of course, became a major international embarrassment, alienating many U.S. allies and aiding its enemies in their claims that America is an aggressor state that cannot be trusted.  

Does all of this – confused war aims and phony intelligence – sound familiar? It should.     

Phase Two in Vietnam was marked by a refusal to reconsider the war’s “strategic” rationale. Rather, debate focused only on “tactical” issues as the war went sour.

By1965 things had begun going badly for U.S. military operations. By the end of March 1968, public opinion was turning against the war and Johnson chose not to run for re-election. His own party in Congress was breaking with him, and the pro-war New York Times reversed itself that summer.  

During this phase, no major leader or opinion maker in the United States dared revisit the key strategic judgment: did the U.S. war aim of containing China make sense? Instead, debate focused on how the war was being fought: on search-and-destroy operations, on body counts, and pacification efforts.

This obsession with tactical issues made it easier to ignore the strategic error. As time passed, costs went up, casualties increased, and public support fell. We could not afford to “cut and run,” it was argued. “The Viet Cong would carry out an awful blood-letting.” Supporters of the war expected no honest answer when they asked “How can we get out?” Eventually Senator Aiken of Vermont gave them one: “In boats.”

Phase Two in Iraq reveals that the same kind of strategic denial error prevails today. Since 2003, public discourse has focused on how the war is being fought. Reconstruction is inadequate. Not enough troops are available. We should not have dismantled the Iraqi military. Elections will save the day. The insurgency is in its “last throes.” And so on. Some of these criticisms are valid, but they fail to address the fundamental issue, the validity of U.S. strategic purpose.

As al Qaeda marched into a country where it had not dared to tread before, the White House refused to admit that its war allowed them in. As Iran’s influence with Iraqi Shiite clerics and militias quietly expands, the administration refuses to confess its own culpability. As Shiite politicians appear headed to dominate the U.S.-created “democracy” in Iraq, no one is asking “Who lost Iraq to Iran?”  

Instead, after each election and referendum in Iraq, hope surges in the media. The New York Times’s reporting on the elections in February of last year was eerily reminiscent of its reporting from Saigon on the 1968 elections.

The end of Phase Two is not yet here, but the Congress is showing signs of nervousness about where the war is taking the country. Republican Senator Chuck Hagel has said that by no measure can it be said that the United States is winning the war. Republican Congressman Walter Jones is trying to push a resolution through the House, calling on the President to begin a withdrawal. When Democratic Congressman Jack Murtha, a highly decorated Marine war veteran, asserted that the war was hopeless and that U.S. forces should be withdrawn, supporters of the Bush White House attacked his patriotism. Sadly, the Democratic leadership refused to defend him.

Does all this sound familiar? Not entirely. In 1968 the Democratic Congress proved willing to oppose the Democrat in the White House. The Republican Congress today has yet to show the same courage and wisdom.

Phase Three in Vietnam was marked by “Vietnamization” and “make-believe diplomacy” in Paris, policies still ignoring the strategic realities at the war’s beginning.

The wind-down in Vietnam actually started in Johnson’s last year in office, but Richard Nixon implemented it (taking his time doing so).  Rather than a rapid pullout, he pursued two tactics. The first was turning the war over to South Vietnam’s military so that U.S. forces could withdraw. By 1972 most of them were gone. Second, negotiations in Paris through Soviet intermediaries with the North Vietnamese began. Both were based on transparently false assumptions.  

The key problem in South Vietnam had always been achieving a political consolidation among anti-Viet Cong elites. It was not building effective military and police forces. In fact, as South Vietnamese military units became more effective, their commanders competed aggressively for political power, insuring a weak dictatorial regime in Saigon.   

The assumptions about the Paris peace talks were no less illusory. Their designer, Henry Kissinger, believed that Moscow would “help” the United States reach a settlement short of total capitulation. In fact, by the late 1960s, the war was not only serving Soviet purposes against China, but also weakening NATO, hurting the U.S. currency in the international exchange rates, and making the charge of “imperialism” believable to citizens in many countries allied to the United States. Thus Soviet leaders had no objective reason to help the United States find a face-saving exodus. The deeper into “the big muddy” in Vietnam went the United States, the better for the Soviet Union. Second, Moscow could not have compelled North Vietnamese leaders in Paris to accept half a loaf in South Vietnam. Hanoi was playing off Moscow and Beijing with no intention of conceding its ultimate goal for any price.  

The war ended, we now know, with the abject failure of both policies. As helicopters evacuated the American Embassy in Saigon in 1975, both illusions vanished.

Phase Three in Iraq is only beginning. Early signs were apparent in the presidential election campaign of 2004. Both Bush and Kerry put full confidence in “Iraqization.”  U.S. forces will “stand down” as Iraqi forces “stand up.” They differed only on who could train more Iraqis faster. Nor would they acknowledge that “political consolidation” had to come before “military consolidation,” as the Vietnam experience demonstrated.

In Iraq, we watch U.S.-led make-believe diplomacy negotiating a constitutional deal among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Should we believe that the Iraqi Shiites, a majority of the population with the trauma of Saddam’s bloody repressions burned into their memories, will settle for less than full control? And why should we expect the Kurds to surrender their decade-old autonomy after suffering no less bloody repressions than did the Shiites? And why should we expect Sunnis to trust a Shiite-Kurdish regime not to take revenge against them for Saddam’s crimes? And why would Iran and Syria be willing to abandon support for their co-religionists in Iraq in order to strike a peace deal favorable to the United States?

Will Phase Three in Iraq end with helicopters flying out of the “green zone” in Baghdad? It all sounds so familiar.

The difference lies in the consequences. Vietnam did not have the devastating effects on U.S. power that Iraq is already having. On this point, those who deny the Vietnam-Iraq analogy are probably right. They are wrong, however, in believing that “staying the course” will have any result other than making the damage to U.S. power far greater than changing course and withdrawing sooner in as orderly a fashion as possible.

But even in its differences, Vietnam can be instructive about Iraq. Once the U.S. position in Vietnam collapsed, Washington was free to reverse the negative trends it faced in NATO and U.S.-Soviet military balance, in the world economy, in its international image, and in other areas. Only by getting out of Iraq can the United States possibly gain sufficient international support to design a new strategy for limiting the burgeoning growth of anti-Western forces it has unleashed in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

[Note: an earlier version of this essay had an incorrect date for passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.]

Note: This is the third piece General Odom has written for NiemanWatchdog.org. See also: What’s wrong with cutting and running? (Aug. 3, 2005) and Want stability in the Middle East? Get out of Iraq! (Nov. 11, 2005)

Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), a frequent contributor to NiemanWatchdog, died May 30, 2008, apparently of a heart attack. Odom in recent years had been an aggressive critic of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and was one of the first to call for removing American troops from Iraq. For many years a highly popular professor at Yale, he had been director of the National Security Agency under President Reagan from 1985 to 1988.

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Depressing similarities Posted by Audie Murphy - 03/08/2006, 07:41 PM The Iraq war is more confirmation that those who don't learn from history are condemned to repeat it.

Iraq through the prism of Vietnam Posted by Jack Hicks - retired 03/09/2006, 12:30 PM Hopefully with the advent of 24 hour a day news we won't stay in Iraq as long as Vietnam. But the next two favorites for president are not encouraging. Ole straight talki probably thinks we need more troops and Hillary is trying to figure what is politically expedient.

The general is shell shocked Posted by jack harris - ex-navy, proud American 03/09/2006, 10:30 PM No sorry, but I have to reply here. I was an officer in the Navy stationed on a destroyer in Vietnam and have been following this Iraq war pretty closely. As far as entering the war, Sadaam was given every possible chance to comply with the universal UN resolutions to submit to UN inspections, and so on. He certainly had WMD, he used them, and the world overwhelmingly agreed at one time that we had to make him get rid of them. The threat of military action was the *only* thing that ever made him listen at all in the first place and for 10 years after Desert Storm, he backed out on every commitment he ever made. Removing him power was the only option. Even if you disagree with that choice, we're there now, for better or worse, and leaving it to the terrorists to make this a terrorist run country is just NOT an option at this point. We ARE making progress there, whether anti-war activists want to admit it or not. The outcome is uncertain at best, but few wars in history have EVER had a certain outcome. Why should Iraq be any different? But countless military people and honest journalists around the world point to the many positive things happening in this country. It is a painful transition and resolving the culture conflict from three separate groups in Iraq is no easy task after decades of brutality suffered at the hand of Sadaam. But accurate historical perspective shows us that the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds HAVE live in peaceful coexistence in years past, and they will come to do so again. It remains only for a strong, centralized government to take hold and govern the cou7ntry firmly and fairly. And the U.S. is committed, rightly so, is staying the course until that happens... hopefully sooner than later. We have a critical national security interest to see it through, not an easy task certainly, but the cut and run crowd is completely off base. Leave Iraq to fall to the terrorists and 9/11 will be a monthly occurrence all over the world until there's nothing left. The general smoked too much of that Thai stick in VN and it has addled his brain. Time for the rocking chair, general. Thanks for serving your country once upon a time, but you do it a vast disservice now.

The general is exactly right Posted by Douglas Wilson - 03/09/2006, 11:50 PM I'm ex-Air Force myself, and served from 1963 as the Vietnam War was cranking up, until 1968 when it was all clearly falling apart. I guess the reason gung-ho types like Mr. Harris, above, are still clinging to the party line is that they don't have as vivid a memory as General Odom and I do of the bullroar given out by our leaders, the predictions that turned out wrong, the stubborn refusal to look at the basic assumptions, etc. Even so, I can more easily forgive the brazen mendacity and arrogant prognostications of our Vietnam-era leaders because communism really was a threat, and the momentum was still going in that direction. But South Vietnam wasn't going to tip the world scales, and so the domino theory failed. Asn the general says, history is repeating itself. Just today there is an article from the UK circulating which summarizes recent capitulations on Iraq by the very neocons who sponsored our war there. William Buckley, George Will, Richard Perle, and even the PNAC signatory Francis ***uyama -- all tossing in the towel, admitting they were wrong. Mr. Harris is thus becoming a rare bird, one who still calls the Sunni insurgents "terrorists" and believes the Shiite majority will run the country fairly, despite their long list of blood grievances against the Sunnis, and will love us for helping them, despite evidence that they are using us and loving their Iranian allies instead. There is already a civil war going, and we're just pretending it isn't while fighting on one side of it -- the side that is against American interests in the long run. Mr. Harris, along with his die-hard comrades, forgets that George Bush Senior told his son, and the world, via Brent Scowcroft, not to go into Iraq because the outcome was highly unpredictable and most likely would be worse than dealing with Saddam, our old client before he invaded Kuwait and we had to go in to make Kuwait safe for feudal depotism once again. We have to withdraw because (1) we don't have the troops to keep on as we have in the past, (2) the long term outcome might be better if the Sunnis fight the Shiites to the point they will share power, (3) we are on the wrong side in their civil war, and (4) our presence does more harm than good because both sides hate the occupation. We "liberated" the Iraqis, we did not adopt them. They will sort things out, and have an ocean of oil to help them do it. We need to declare "mission accomplished" again and this time mean it.

"facts are stupid things" - R. Reagan Posted by Jeffrey Copas - 03/10/2006, 12:42 AM I enjoyed the general's viewpoint, and agree with him entirely. The commenter above who thinks some kind of "strong, centralized" government is going to emerge from the hell-hole that is Iraq today sounds like the one who perhaps smoked too much Thai stick in 'Nam. Saddam was the only thing holding that country together (it never was really a country - it was drawn up in a map room in London), and once he was removed the place descended into chaos, and is continuing its descent. And so-called anti-war protestors didn't cause this to happen - the failure of Rumsfeld and DOD to properly plan for this war made it happen, just as much as McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy were responsible for the failed policy in Vietnam. In both instances, we were victims of our own blind arrogance and ignorance, with no command of language, history, or tactics pertinent to the region, and in both instances the American people were promised a "cakewalk", an easy liberation, and welcoming, grateful citizenry. And in both instances, we were either lied to, or ill-served, by ignorant fools for leaders, politicians in air-conditioned offices in Washington who have no business planning and executing a war. Mr. Harris, with all due respect to your service, I just have one question for you - how many times in your lifetime do you have to be lied to by your government before you'll finally pull your head out of your rear and see the truth? One other small point: sorry to be a nitpicker, but the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place on August 4, 1964. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution three days later, on August 7, 1964, declaring "that the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." Sound familiar?

Response to: “The general is shell shocked Posted by jack harris - ex-navy, proud American 03/09/2006, 10:30 PM” Posted by Glenn Anderson - US Army, retired 03/11/2006, 04:33 PM Comment #1: On a personal level, I’m dismayed that any former military officer would disrespect another military officer (especially of General Odom’s stature) with comments like, “The general smoked too much of that Thai stick in VN and it has addled his brain. Time for the rocking chair, general. Thanks for serving your country once upon a time, but you do it a vast disservice now.” You may disagree with his opinions, but there is no need to besmirch his character. For his many years of service, his accomplishments, and his rank, he is entitled to a little more respect. Comment #2: Even if you don’t agree with General Odom’s assessments, his credentials are impressive. His assignments certainly lend credence to his opinions on war and national policies. He is obviously someone who has, “been there, done that.” It always amazes me that we Americans so eagerly listen to the opinions of someone who has little or no experience with an issue before we would listen to a truly credentialed subject-matter-expert. No sane person would go to a used car dealer for advice on their pending heart surgery . . . yet many of us accept as “gospel” advice on the war in Iraq from people who have no training or experience in military affairs or national/international politics. Comment #3. Here’s my acid-test for the pro-Iraq war people like Mr Harris who make comments such as his . . . “And the U.S. is committed, rightly so, is staying the course until that happens... hopefully sooner than later. We have a critical national security interest to see it through, not an easy task certainly, but the cut and run crowd is completely off base. Leave Iraq to fall to the terrorists and 9/11 will be a monthly occurrence all over the world until there's nothing left.” Mr Harris: Do you have any sons or daughters between the ages of 18 and 42? If so, are they serving in the military? If not, why not? If the whole future of the American way of life is at stake with the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq, why are not more of the pro-war, right-wing conservatives joining the military or encouraging their children to join? Could it be because it’s easier to let some other parent’s kid die for a cause you so strongly believe in, or . . . is it that your beliefs are not strong enough to sacrifice your kids for? I have one daughter and one son. My daughter just completed Army basic training and will probably be in Iraq within a year. My son graduates from Army ROTC in two more years. Why would I let my kids join the military when I don’t support the war in Iraq? Because I believe, at some point down the road, there will be legitimate threats to America and the need for a strong military to defend us . . . long after President Bush is gone from office and the war and Iraq is over. Put your money where your mouth is, Mr Harris.

The reason to go is the reason to stay Posted by JJ Spreij - 03/13/2006, 03:50 PM There is one difference between Iraq and Vietman: oil. It was the only reason for the USA to go in; and it is the reason it will stay. The meaning of Peak Oil is well understood by the neo conservatives.

Audie Murphy Posted by John Poteet - 03/15/2006, 03:37 AM Audie Murphy died in 1971. Recipient of every medal of valor the United States has the power to bestow. His name should not be used by someone who wishes to post without attribution.

How can media help Posted by Raj Bajpai - Private Citizen wondering if the media knows its full power and influence. 03/15/2006, 05:35 PM I think the media has a huge responsibility in helping Americans make the right choices in their leaders. In my opinion, it did a shameful job by tacitly encouraging Bush's re-election in 2004. My experience has been that the average American is seriously malnourished when it comes to true information or true facts. If they had understood the facts and not indulged in their fear that the media was stoking, they would have certainly made the right choices in the elections, as they have shown in the past.

Lessons not learned Posted by Brian Watt - 03/15/2006, 09:47 PM Early in his administration, Ceasar Atexas bragged about how even a "C" student could become President. Perhaps, he should have declared that even a military failure could become President. It's no wonder we're repeating the past. The entire Neo-Con bunch was stateside with deferments and special treatment during the Viet Nam period. Considering Cheney's aim, there's no doubt in my mind they've never fired a shot in anger for real! Why are these people being allowed to put Americans in harm's way? End this madnss NOW!

Gen. Odom Knows of What he Speaks Posted by Dick de Seve - New Hampshire Peace Action 03/16/2006, 03:59 PM It was reassuring to see that the military leaders from the Vietnam era so clearly see the parallels between the Iraq war and the Vietnam conflict. The same mistakes are being repeated, because the neo-cons need to repeat them in their quest for economic and political domination. It's a shame to see someone like Mr. Harris swallow the administration's nonsensical lies and assurances of "progress". 100,000+ dead Iraqis, 2,300 dead Americans, tens of thousands more injured and maimed, the various factions at each other's throats, and Mr. Harris thinks that's "progress"??? Saddam once upon a time had WMD, thanks to US. He destroyed them 15 years ago, and did not reconstitute them. We knew that; these were just an excuse for a pre-planned invasion. There will be no democracy or stable government in Iraq until every last American soldier, contractor, and mercenary has left Iraq so that the people there can determine their own future. There is no "victory" to be had, and the only honor is to be had in withdrawing and admitting our mistakes, and our hubris.

waving flag obscures view!! Posted by Tom Welsh - 03/16/2006, 04:25 PM Mr.Harris, after misrepresenting the turn of events in Iraq concerning the regime's position on weapons inspectors, resorts to an ad hominem attack on Gen. Odom. This is an old, tired, fallacious tactic employed by those who are simply outgunned by the facts and resort to acts of deperation. And as far as Mr. Anderson's "acid test" is concerned, it is clever but misses the point. Just as Cindy Sheehan's loss gives her no more moral suasion on the Iraq issue than anyone else enjoys, given that her son's motivation was to enlist and go there to "be with his buddies," military service or lack of it is meaningless. Absent a draft, all who enlist voluntarily take up arms and agree to murder others in the name of American corporate interests and the corrupt political/power agendas of the power elite. This has been the case for the last 50 years, and is CERTAINLY evident in the current "conflict."

THe arrogance of power and the faith based presidency Posted by eric hart - US Coast Guard, Retired 03/17/2006, 01:25 AM I find a difference between the war today and the war in Vietnam. Johson showed evidence that, in private, he had grave concerns about America's presence in Southeast Asia and choose not to run for re-election. He showed that he could reason and use evidence to make decisions. Leaks from the Bush White House ex-confidants show an incredibly arrogant and out of touch president with little understanding of history, or laws of unintended consequences."Flashback" as the C.I.A. calls it, apparently was never a concern. According to Bushes own minions and exminions, the presidents decision making is decidedly non-rational, and unempirical. He preferst to trust his gut, and consult with God. The faith based presidency takes on a new meaning if one takes it to mean a president who's decisions are not evidence based, or rational, but gut level responses to his faith in himself. Perhaps Bertand Russell said it best when he said, "The problem with the world is that the cocksure are idiots and the intelligent are full of doubt". Indeed. Have we ever seen such cocksuredness and idiocy combined? I agree with previous author that arrogance and ignorance are simply breathtaking in this current neo-con regime. Bush and his inner circle have done more than Al Queida could have ever done to Americas strategic and economic interests. History may show that a few arrogant civilians, with no military experience, have begun the decline of the American empire. I hope this thesis is incorrect, but I fear that it is right.

No Lessons Of History Posted by Kevin Harlowe - 03/17/2006, 12:58 PM Until I read this essay, I despaired of the notion that an actual intellect might be brought to bear on this question. Certainly, at the pop level, this seems to be impossible; unfurl the flag in front of the average person and he gets an erection, his brain shuts down and he’ll do what he’s told. Unfortunately, what they’re being told is to toss our soldiers into a sand soaked meat grinder. That General Odom is privy to the kind of critical, objective thinking that evades the general public is encouraging; the despair sets in when you witness the difficulty of inculcating in the citizenry that same ability to critique foreign policy. Waving the flag just doesn’t cut it. This is an unusually lucid and coherent analysis. I haven’t seen many people who fully grasp just how counterproductive our Vietnam policy was. Apparently, of all our leaders who confronted this problem, only JFK had the faintest grasp of it; he was, after all, withdrawing us, but even he based his decision more on the psychology of the American public, recognizing as he did that we wouldn’t accept casualties unless there were something to be gained from it; and there simply was nothing for us in Vietnam. We could have exploited the crack in the communist world; instead, we gave them a cause and a target, and allowed Russia a foothold in asia. Those who doubt this should remember what happened, that within five years of our defeat, Russia and China were exchanging artillery duels in Manchuria, and China invaded North Vietnam briefly, which hardly presented the image of world wide communism as some sort of monolithic threat. The analogies to Iraq are not, as he noted, perfect; but they’re sufficient to leave one breathless—a phony Golf of Tonkin incident vs non existent a-bombs; insufficient personnel committed to the operation; an intractable civilian population; the lack of exit strategy—one need not elaborate this. Indeed, every time I tell myself this isn’t Vietnam , I remember another analogy--the road side bombs and suicide bombers; one tends to forget this because it was over shadowed by the war itself, but it was a common feature of Vietnam. However, as Odom points out, considering the matter thusly is to surrender to the immediate obsession with body counts and territory; it is more profitable to consider the matter from the strategic level, at which point it seems even worse. His three phases are illustrative: they consist, quite simply, of misinterpretation and ill considered response ;stumbling into quicksand while resolutely spouting slogans as justification; desperately seeking the egress under the pretense of victory. Odom mentions Aiken, the senator from Vermont; it was he who told LBJ his solution to the mess was to declare a victory and withdraw, and that is what I love about history, how the jokes become reality: in the end, that’s just what we did. And what we will probably do in Iraq. We took away the only thing that held this loose conglomeration of warring tribes together, and what a better world we’ve given them, one in which they’re daily fodder for terrorists, and their politicians are so dedicated they meet for only half an hour. What bothers me about it is this, its dreary predictability; I was a high school student during Vietnam, and yet, absent the CIA’s network of spies and spy planes and a council of advisors, I knew what was going to happen. And I can see it here, too; the place will descend into chaos of civil war absent one of several events. The country is partitioned into three, which creates its own set of sub problems; a much larger multinational force establishes a permanent security presence, unlikely since we’ve managed to alienate most of the world by acting “unilaterally.” That word gets the right wing all hot and bothered, but they forget its consequences, that you may act on your own, but you also incur all the casualties. Ultimately, this reduces to the simple question why are we doing the bidding of the enemy? Can this be blamed on ideological blindness, or is there another, even more odious analogy to Vietnam, that both LBJ and George Bush are village idiots from Texas and neither could remove his hands from his genitals long enough to employ his brain. Bush’s vision is of a reverse domino theory, one in which democracy spreads like pollen from one country to another. Well, we can’t even knock over the lead domino, so how are the rest to fall? I no longer believe in the “lessons of history.” No one will learn; no students means no lessons. And to those of you who assert a concern for the sufferings of the Iraqi people, I might ask why you’re suddenly all warm and fuzzy over people we’ve ignored for half a century, or more to the point, what’s the difference between being gassed by Hussein’s goons or blown up by sectarian terrorists? If you have to get warm and fuzzy, do so for our soldiers. War can only be justified under one set of circumstances, that your failure to go to war assures your destruction; by that criteria we haven’t been in a justifiable war since WWII! Sorry to offend those of you who are all teary eyed over the Iraqis, but I thinkt the lives of our soldiers are of greater import; indeed, to believe anything less is to devalue them in favor of foreigners. Funny, but I remember George Bernard Shaw making that point, somewhere, that the true patriot generally prefers killing foreigners to saving fellow country men. I remember in his play the Devil’s Disciple, he made a cogent point, something so significant it should be branded on the forehead of every president and all his advisors. When General Burgoyne asks of Major Swindon what the redcoats would do in the face of superior colonial forces, Swindon replies with a cliché: “Our duty.” Burgoyne’s response: “In the future, sir, I must ask that you be a bit less generous with the blood of your men, and a bit more generous with your own brain.”

Vietnam Iraq Posted by Lot Joy - 03/19/2006, 07:16 PM Two differences between the wars: 1. We had 20 years of anti-communist frenzy before Vietnam; the invasion of Iraq seemed manufactured out of thin air. 2. Vietnam at least, was a beautiful country. Iraq looks like Death Valley. I Corps 1970-1971

Oh My God. I agree with Odom on something. Posted by Bill Rhodes - photojournalist 04/16/2006, 09:30 PM I never thought that possible. We are through the looking glass on this one, way through it. Btw, I was on one of the last helicopters to leave the US Embassy in Saigon. It is coming. Have no fear. I hope history judges our country harshly for this failure to learn. I wonder if the press will learn this time? HM3/USN USMC 4/9

What about the Iraqis? Posted by Vietnamese American - 04/21/2006, 08:11 PM Lt Gen Odom, Sir, your analysis is intriguing. But if America assesses that Iraq is a sunk cost and decides to leave, what will happen to all of the Iraqis who put their stock in America's empty promises? If the armada of helicopters come to pull Americans from the Green Zone, what will happen to the thousands who were their allies? Reprisals already happen on a daily basis against American 'collaborators'. One difference is Hanoi and their VC-co-conspirators had an agenda for a post-American Viet-Nam, albeit an onerous authoritarianism. If America were to leave, what would prevent absolute chaos from reigning, save for the power that proved to be as brutal as Saddam and as fanatic as the Taliban? What would prevent Islamist fanatics throughout the world from believing that the power of faith and guerilla warfare can bring down the most powerful military on the planet? I served as a military advisor to Iraqis in 2004. And I am a Vietnamese-American. I am cognizant of my bias. But tell me, sir, is there a solution that doesn't involve selling out and abandoning people that we've made promises to? To me, this is the most pointed analogy. In 1975, 2 million refugees left Viet-Nam. The US lost 53,000, but South Viet-Nam lost 250,000--and have been both erased from Vietnamese history and derided by American history. Is democracy a privilege only afforded to white European nations, America, and Australia? If America can't keep a promise, nor stand for what it professes, why do we put on this uniform every day? There is cold-eyed, rational objectivity. But there is also decency, honor, and morality. The former should govern how we execute the mission. But the later should always explain why.

History and Historical Lessons Posted by Shane Mahoney - 05/03/2006, 12:27 PM In many respects, history is the laboratory of the social sciences. Our ability to see its patterns and learn from them naturally depend on how accurately it is reconstructed — and how well we understand the human condition at work in them. General Odom's credentials make him a person to pay attention to — but not necessarily someone to believe. In this instance, his depiction of what occurred in Vietnam is remarkably tendentious and inaccurate. Thus, preferred parallels can all too easily be drawn and genuine, empirical parallels overlooked. With regard to both Vietnam and Iraq, the starting point for an honest assessment of our involvement must be an examination of American national interests. While General Odom's history of Vietnam presumes there were none, he does seem to suggest that there are legitimate American interests in the Middle East. Yet, these are not addressed. Criticism of the present inept administration is easy — and easily documented. But it gets us nowhere. I do not find General Odom's "cut and run" recommendation offensive. Rather, I find it irrelevant and irresponsible in the absence of a discussion of American national interests and how to secure them. Neither the press nor General Odom address this central matter. Submit a comment - Jump to top of list